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IMPORTING DEATH AS A PART OF FREE TRADE: AN
ARGUMENT FOR A PROHIBITION ON THE IMPORTATION OF
FOODS CONTAINING THE RESIDUE OF BANNED PESTICIDES
DEREK REDMOND*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is one of the largest exporters of pesticides in the
world. Many of the pesticides are so dangerous that they are banned for use
in the United States. There is no doubt that the use of these pesticides in the
third world countries where they are exported is devastating. "But we are
victims too. Pesticide exports create a circle of poison"' by returning to the
United States in the food we import. Concern over the dangers of pesticides
became a maj or national concern after Rachel Carson published Silent Spring
in 1962.2 Between 1962 and 1980, the United States Congress took major
steps to regulate domestic production and use of pesticides.3 Then in 1980,
David Weir and Mark Shapiro brought national attention to the hazards of
allowing the unregulated exportation of dangerous pesticides when they
published Circle of Poison.4 Pesticides banned for use in the United States
were being exported to third world countries and used in the production of
crops that were to be imported back into the United States covered with the
lethal residue of the banned pesticides.5 Twenty years later the circle of
poison still exists.
* Derek Redmond is a 2003 J.D. candidate attending the College of William and Mary
School of Law. Mr. Redmond received a B.A. in Psychology from the College of William
and Mary in 1998.
'DAVID WEr & MARK SHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON (1981).
2 Karen A. Goldberg, Comment, Efforts to Prevent Misuse of Pesticides Exported to
Developing Countries: ProgressingBeyondRegulation andNotification, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1025, 1031 (1985).
3 See id. at 1032.
4 See WEIR & SHAPIRO, supra note 1.
5 See Jefferson D. Reynolds, International Pesticide Trade: Is There Any Hope
For The Effective Regulation of Controlled Substances?, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 69,
77 (1997).
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Pesticides in general can be a valuable tool for protecting crops and
preventing the spread of diseases.6 Certain pesticides, however, have been
banned because they can also cause a plethora of negative affects. Banned
pesticides cause environmental damage such as water pollution, soil
degradation, and destruction of flora and fauna and health damage to humans
such as cancer, reproductive and neurological impairments and mutation.7
Recent congressional amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act ("FFDCA")8 have increased the ease by which known
carcinogens can reach the plates of the American public. The United States'
policy concerning the regulation of pesticides places American lives at risk
by: 1) permitting the importation of agricultural products that have the
residues of pesticides which are made in the United State but are banned
from use in the United States; 2) using an analysis process that takes
economic factors into consideration when evaluating the risk to human lives
when setting regulatory standards; and 3) allowing the production and
exportation of pesticides which have been proven to be so dangerous that
they cannot be used at all in the United States. This Note analyzes whether
current United States laws and international treaties are sufficient tools to
protect the American public from the importation of dangerous pesticides and
advocates for a ban on the export of pesticides which are banned for use in
the United States. Part I introduces the historical context in which the debate
over United States food safety is taking place. Part II will discuss current
United States laws as they relate to the regulation of pesticide residues. Part
Im addresses the role international treaties have played in developing
international import/export policy. Part IV explains how domestic and
international law can be used to increase food safety which supports the
conclusion in Part V that the export of banned pesticides should be
prohibited.
6 See id. at 73.
7 See id. at 73-74.
8 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-97 (2000).
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A. Historical Context of the Pesticide Debate
1. From Silent Spring to the Pesticide Boomerang
In 1962 Rachel Carson introduced the world to the dangers of
pesticides through her book Silent Spring. "One expert on pesticides praised
Carson's work by proposing that the history of crop pest control might be
divided into two periods-BC, Before Carson and AC, After Carson-and
suggested that not until these latter days did man realize 'that pesticides were
not the panacea heralding the millennium." 9 Carson warned that pesticides
created an imbalance in the ecosystem that is as dangerous for humans as
they are for the insects they were designed to kill.'0 She argued that because
insects possess the ability to develop resistance to pesticides, farmers would
be required to continually increase the amount of pesticides applied." This
would cause a build up of large amounts of pesticides, which would
eventually make it up the food chain and become deposited in the fatty cells
of humans.'2 Carson believed that pesticides deposited in human fatty cells
cause mutations in genetic material much like radioactive material. 3 Carson
also warned that the cumulative affects of multiple exposures to a variety of
seemingly harmless pesticides could become lethal. 4 Silent Spring brought
the debate over the use of pesticides like DDT and kindred organic
insecticides to the forefront of the public debate.'5
Congress responded to the growing public concern by ratifying the
Delaney Clause in 1958. 6 The Delaney Clause defined any cancer-causing
agent as presenting an unreasonable risk. 7 Congressman Delaney, in
advocating for a zero tolerance standard stated:
9 JAMES WHORTON, BEFORE SILENT SPRING viii (1974).
1o See RICHARD PROCTOR, CANCER WARS 48 (1995).
11 Id. at49.
12 id.
'
3 See id. at 50.
14 See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 31-32 (1962).
" See WHORTON, supra note 9, at viii.
'6 See Donna U. Vogt, FDA's Enforcement Authorities for Foods: Are They Adequate?,
CRS, 94-441 SPR, 4 (May 25, 1994).
'7 See Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 348 (c)(3) (2000) [hereinafter Delaney Clause] ("[N]o additive shall
be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if
it is found after test which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives,
to induce cancer in man or animals. .. ").
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The part that chemical additives play in the cancer picture
may not yet be completely understood, but enough is known
to put us on our guard. The safety of the public health
demands that chemical additives should be specifically
protested for carcinogenicity. . . .That door should be
slammed shut and locked. That is the purpose of my
anticarcinogen provision.' 8
Experts in food law stated that the clause acted as an "unequivocal judgment
that consumers should not be exposed to food ingredients shown to cause
cancer, regardless of the benefits the ingredients might provide or the
magnitude of the risk that they might present."' 9 The Delaney Clause
prohibited the use of any food additive found in any amount to induce cancer
in animals or humans.20 At the time that the Delaney Clause was enacted,
scientists did not believe that significant numbers of food additives would
prove to be carcinogenic. For example, in 1957 W.C. Hueper of the National
Cancer Institute predicted that only four direct food additives, eight food
colors and three classes of chemical contaminants would be carcinogenic.2
Hueper stated: It is unlikely.., that many of the presently used additives
and contaminants of foodstuffs, especially most of those of purely inorganic
nature, unless they are radioactive or belong to the group of carcinogenic
metals... introduce any carcinogenic hazard into the general food supply.
... ,,22 Hueper's contention was proven wrong when in 1985 the National
Cancer Institute identified 148 possible carcinogenic chemicals.23
In 1981 David Weir and Mark Schapiro showed the American public
that, despite the Delaney Clause, their food was still not safe from
contamination. The Circle of Poison explained that the United States does
not escape hazardous chemicals simply by banning them at home because the
1 Food Additives. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong. 498 (1958).
"9 Richard A. Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause. Repudiation of
Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 1 (1988); See generally Vogt, supra note 16, at 4.
2o See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000).
23 See Merrill, supra note 19, at 15-16.
22 W.C.Hueper, Potential Role of Non-Nutritive Food Additives and Contaminants as
Environmental Carcinogens, 62 A.M.A. ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY 218, 222-24 (1957),
quoted in Merrill supra note 18, at 16.23 See generally PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS (1985), quoted in Merrill, supra note 19, at 18.
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pesticides return to us in a phenomenon called the "pesticide boomerang. '24
The pesticide boomerang is the return of banned pesticides to the United
States as residue on foods that we import.25 The book explained that in 1979
approximately ten percent of our imported food contained illegal levels of
pesticides.26 At that time, nearly forty percent of the 1.6 billion pounds of
pesticides produced in the United States were sold for export. This showed
that United States pesticide exports were a major contributor to the food
safety problem.
2. Debate Over the Delaney Clause
During the 38 years in which the Delaney Clause was law, Congress,
environmentalists, scientists and industry advocates have been involved in
a heated debate. The lines seem to be clearly drawn between those in support
of the zero tolerance standard of the Delaney Clause and those in support of
the negligible risk standard enacted in the Food Quality Protection Act
("FQPA").28
The arguments used today in support of the negligible risk standard
are no different than those used in 1958 to prevent the adoption of the
Delaney Clause's zero risk standard. For example, during the debate over the
Delaney Clause, The Commerce Committee favorably reported on a bill
introduced by Chairman John B. Williams which lacked the anti-cancer
language of the Delaney Clause.2 9 The Committee reasoned that "since the
scientific investigation and the other relevant data to be taken into
consideration by the Secretary include information with respect to possible
cancer causing characteristics of a proposed additive, the public will be
protected from possible harm on this count."3 The report advocated a safety
standard which required the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to
obtain "proof of reasonable certainty that no harm will result from the
24 See WEIR & SCHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 28.
21 See id. at 28.
2 Id.
27 See David Weir, The Boomerang Crime, MOTHER
JONES, athttp://www.motherjones.com/motherjones/N79/weir jump.html (last visited Oct.
7, 2002).
2 Pub. L .No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y and
21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 342, 346a (2000).
29 H.R. REP. No. 85-2284, at 5 (1958), quoted in Merrill, supra note 18, at 56.30id.
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proposed use of an additive."3' Congress applied the zero tolerance policy
of the Delaney Clause because the science of 1958 was not equipped to
handle such a responsibility. Our ability to see the error in the science of
1958 and the benefit of applying a zero risk standard to compensate for
scientific uncertainty is an insight that is only gained in hindsight. Likewise,
Congress's modem day assumption that science will provide a degree of
certainty in determining safety is as unfounded as it was in 1958.
Proponents for the FQPA claimed that advances in science and
technology justify abandoning the Delaney Clause. One advocate, Dr. Fred
Shank, testified before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of
the United States House of Representatives that:
At the time the Food Additive Amendments were enacted
(1958), the Delaney clause, literally interpreted, was
consistent with the scientific knowledge and technology of
the day: the number of known or postulated carcinogens was
fairly small, and the then state of the art capability to detect
a substance at a level of a few parts per million was
considered ultra-sensitive. As testing methods have become
more sophisticated, however, it has become abundantly clear
that a new approach for addressing risk is needed.32
Dr. Shank failed to realize that the increased ability to detect a
carcinogen simply means that we are more aware of the magnitude of the
danger to which we are subjecting ourselves. Unfortunately, without having
the knowledge of how the harm from exposure can be prevented, our current
scientific knowledge is not sufficient to support a sound regulatory policy.
Judge Tamm summarized the problem with scientific knowledge best when
he said "what scientists know about the causes of cancer is how limited is
their knowledge."33
3 Id.
32 Safety of Pesticides in Food Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2342 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. (1991)
(statement of Fred R. Shank, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition),
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/SPEECH/SPE00002.htm (June 19, 1991).
3' Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1978) quoted in FRANK B. CROSS,
ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW 11 (1989).
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3. Statistical Data Supports a Zero Tolerance Standard
Congress seems to have ignored the fact that when the safety net of
the zero tolerance standard was in effect, thousands of lives were still being
lost to pesticide poisoning each year.34 "In the mid 1990s it was estimated
that in America pesticides killed about 10,400 people. 35 These pesticides
included banned pesticides such as Aldrin, Dieldrin, and DDT. Banning
these pesticides and increasing import regulation has failed to prevent these
dangerous pesticides from invading our shores. In 1986 the FDA revoked
the tolerances for residues of DDT, chlordane, and dieldrin.36 The revocation
of the tolerances meant that any imported food containing trace amounts of
the pesticides should be denied entry into the country. Yet ten years later, in
1996, all three pesticides were detected in foods being imported. In 1996,
11.5 percent of the sampled imported foods contained either violative levels
of pesticide residues or illegal types of pesticides.37 In 1999, DDT, chlordane,
dieldrin and aldrin (all banned in the United States) were four of the ninety
pesticides detected in its annual regulatory monitoring survey.38 "Over seven
percent of agricultural imports to the United States originate in Central
American countries where pesticides banned or restricted in this country
often contaminate food, feed, water and wildlife. '39 These statistics are
overwhelming proof that even today a significant amount of the foods that
are imported into the United States contain the residue of illegal and banned
pesticides. Using a science based regulatory standard will simply legalize the
danger that already exists.
Supporters of a negligible risk standard claim that environmental
activists are simply alarmists who use scare tactics rather than scientific
evidence.' Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman have published several
opinion surveys contrasting the views of scientists and activists on several
"4 See Martin J. Walker, Home Sickness, THE ECOLOGIST 40 (May 2001).
35 Id.
36 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-95-23, PESTICIDES: REDUCING
EXPOSURE TO RESIDUES OF CANCELED PESTICIDES, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN
ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMMrITEE, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 4 (Dec. 1994).
31 See Food and Drug Administration, Pesticide Program Residue Monitoring 1996, at
www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/pes96rep.html 7 (1996) (last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
38 See id.
39 Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1028-29.
40 See SIR ROBERT LICHTER & STANLEY ROTHMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER-A
POLITICAL DISEASE 173-83 (1999).
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environmental issues. 4' They claim that these studies prove that
environmental activists do not have the scientific support to justify a zero
tolerance approach to regulating pesticides.42 While these studies have been
affective in showing that there are significant differences between the
opinions of scientists and activist, the authors failed to offer any scientific
data as justification for the scientists' opinions. The Lichter and Rothman
studies illustrate that scientists who reject a zero tolerance approach to
pesticides are merely operating under the risky presumption that pesticides
should be considered safe until proven to be a significant danger. For
example, in one study scientists and activists agreed that smoking and
asbestos are major causes of cancer, yet only twenty-one percent of the
scientists versus forty-seven percent of the activists considered DDT to be a
major cause.43 The cancer causing effects of smoking and asbestos have been
thoroughly studied and widely accepted as major causes of cancer. It is
entirely likely that scientists are less likely to consider DDT as a major cause
of cancer, despite the massive deaths that resulted from its application in the
early 1960s, because the impact of DDT has not been fully researched and
understood.
Robert Proctor makes it quite clear' in his book, Cancer Wars, that
the debate over the carcinogenic character of pesticides has been more of an
issue of political position than scientific knowledge.45 Proctor explains that
the current assumption in the research community is that cancer is caused by
high-level exposures to carcinogens.46 However, that assumption has not
always proven true. Each year 7,000 to 30,000 deaths occur in the United
States from exposure to radon gas in homes, the majority of which occur at
levels below the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA's") safety
threshold.47 Dangerous philosophical assumptions and political orientations
undermine the reliability of scientific research as a tool for determining a
standard of safety in pesticide regulation. Good regulatory policy should take
account of this reliability problem and err on the side of safety. The only way
to obtain safety is by adopting a zero tolerance standard and prohibiting the
export and production of banned pesticides.
4' See generally id. at 99-130.
42 See id. at 183.
41 See id. at 120.
44 See PROCTOR, supra note 10, at 154.45 Id.
46 See id.
41 See id.
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4. The EPA and FDA Have Traditionally Advocated for Lower
Standards
Over time the EPA and FDA have gradually acquiesced to the
pressures of the chemical industry to ease chemical regulation. In 1973, the
FDA, in contravention of the Delaney Clause, had a policy that a carcinogen
had to have a cancer risk of less than one in one hundred million in order to
be considered to have "no significant human risk."48 Then in 1977, the FDA
lowered the standard and declared that a carcinogen food additive is safe if
the risk is lower than one in one million.49 Yet, even after the repeal of the
Delaney Clause environmentalists claim that the EPA is failing to adhere to
the one in one million cancer standard which was established in the FDA's
regulatory history and the legislative history of the 1996 FQPA. 0
Environmental groups have been fighting for years to push the EPA
to enforce and advocate laws that would protect the American public.5 In
Les v. Reilly, the EPA refused to ban certain pesticide that they knew caused
cancer." The United States Court of Appeals held that the Delaney clause
should be enforced strictly against all carcinogens in processed foods.53 The
court reasoned that the Delaney Clause "intended to ensure that no
carcinogens, no matter how small the amount, would be introduced into
food. ' '54 Despite the court ruling in Les v. Reilly the EPA refused to
consistently 5 enforce the clause if the cancer risk was not higher than one in
one million.
56
Congress, like the EPA, has traditionally provided little to no support
for a zero tolerance standard even when it was clearly necessary. In 1998, the
Center for Public Integrity published a report entitled "Unreasonable Risk:
The Politics of Pesticides." The study shows that "Congress has.., put the
48Food Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic
Residues, 42 Fed. Reg. 10,412, 10,421 (1977), cited in Merrill, supra note 19, at 28.
49 See id.
'o See Pesticides: Environmental Representative Assails EPA Risk Decisions Under New
Food Safety Law, 21 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 204, 204 (May 23, 1997).
SI See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 986 (9th Cir.1992).
52 See id.
5 See id. at 990.
"Id. at 989.
" See Merrill, supra note 19, at 9 ("On only four occasions did FDA rely on the Clause as
the basis for refusing to allow a substance in food.").
56 See id.
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economic interests of the pesticide industry ahead of the safety of the
American public."57 The study showed that "from 1988 to 1995, more than
65 bills were introduced in Congress to tighten pesticide regulations. Not one
of them passed."5
B. Congress Repeals the Delaney Clause
1. Congress Adopts a Negligible Risk Standard
Despite increased technology and regulatory power the pesticide
boomerang still exists today and it may get worse. In 1999 the FDA reported
that imported foods were three times more likely to contain illegal pesticides
than domestic food products.59 Yet, in 1996 Congress repealed the absolute
protection of the Delaney Clause and replaced it with a lower and less
reliable one. The Delaney Clause was replaced by a "negligible risk"
standard, which is to be determined by the EPA.6° The new Act, entitled the
FQPA, states:
As used in this section the term "safe," with respect to a
tolerance for a pesticide chemical residue, means that the
Administrator has determined that there is a reasonable
certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to
the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated
dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there is
reliable information.6'
This new standard relies on scientific knowledge to assess the risks
and removes the safety net of an absolute bar on cancer causing pesticides.
A science-based standard places the public at risk on two levels. First, the
scientific data identifying the cancer causing properties of pesticides are
57 See The Center for Public Integrity, Unreasonable Risk: The Politics of Pesticides 3, at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/ dtaweb/downloads/unreasonable risk.pdf (Nov. 20, 2002).5 Id. at 4.
59 See Food and Drug Admin., Pesticide Program Residue Monitoring 1999, at
http://www.fluoridealert.org/ pesticides/ FDA.Residu.Monitor. 1999.htm (last visited Nov.
20,2002) (reporting that 0.8 percent of domestic samples contained violative residues vs. 3.1
percent violative residues found in imported samples).60 See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
61 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
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often incomplete, subject to error and skewed by industry advocates.
Second, the translation of data into scientific conclusions may be grounded
in unproven assumptions and deep-seated political views. The negligible risk
standard subjects the American public to several layers of risk which are
unnecessary and possibly fatal.
2. A Scientific Risk Assessment Leaves Room for Too Much Error
The scientific risk assessment required by FQPA is grounded in the
misconception that the EPA can achieve scientific certainty in assessing the
cancer causing affects of pesticides. However, scientists, environmentalists
and industry advocates agree that the scientific data is not sufficient to assess
the cancer causing potential of a carcinogen.62 The possibility for error in
assessing causation, epidemiology and threshold exposure levels is so great
that current methods of risk assessment are not sufficient to support a reliable
government regulatory scheme.63 Ray McAllister, director of regulatory
affairs of the American Crop Protection Association, a pesticide industry
group, stated that the "data are too sparse to draw definitive conclusions
about the role that the minor constituents of food-like trace amounts of
pesticides ...play in causing or preventing cancer in humans."' The
National Academy of Science determined that of the 8,627 chemicals
regulated or classified by the FDA complete risk evaluations were available
for only five percent.65
A recent scientific debate over the carcinogenic character of a widely
used group of insecticides called "pyrethrins" illustrates that modem day
62 Industry advocates and chemical producers claim that current scientific studies are an
inaccurate measure of the cancer causing potential of pesticides because they overestimate
the risks to humans by using high-level exposures in animal testing. See PROCTOR, supra
note 10, at 167-70. Likewise, environmental advocates claim that the studies are a poor
predictor because it fails to take into consideration the cumulative affects of low-level
exposures. See id. at 154 & 170.63 See CROSS, supra note 33, at 64 ("Extensive reliance on quantitative risk assessment may
be deemed unscientific and unreliable for use in government regulation of carcinogens.").
64 Risk Assessment: EWG Site Details Food Residues; Industry Faults Information as
"Alarmist, "22Chem.Reg.Rep.(BNA) 1574(Jan. 15, 1999), available athttp://www.bna.com
(last visited Dec. 20, 2002).
65 See Merrill, supra note 19, at 16-17.
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science is still ill equipped to provide definitive answers. 66 The EPA Office
of Pesticide Programs Cancer Assessment Review Committee issued a final
rule designating pyrithrins as likely to cause cancer.67 The designation was
based on studies conducted in both 1995 and 1999 in which tumors were
detected in rats exposed to the pesticide.68 Yet industry representatives have
been purported to be providing data to the EPA which if accepted would
change the seemingly "final rule" and remove the pesticide from the list of
reported carcinogens. 69
When the EPA determines that a carcinogenic pesticide poses a
negligible risk it has the functional affect of establishing a threshold below
which exposure to the pesticide should be safe."° Yet, the most hotly debated
scientific issue concerning carcinogens is whether there actually are
"thresholds" below which exposure to a carcinogen can be safe."' In 1983 Dr.
Bernard Weinstein of the Columbia University School of Public Health
testified before Congress:
Although the response to various types of carcinogens is
likely to be dose dependent, I know of no evidence that
clearly establishes a threshold level for any carcinogen.
Furthermore, even if this were established in a given
experimental system, it would be difficult to predict with
confidence the threshold level in a heterogeneous human
population.72
This statement is as true today as it was in 1983. Scientists such as Bruce
Ames73 and industry advocates claim that exposure to low levels of certain
66 See Pesticides: Pyrethrin Cancer Classification Case Pending as Reassessment Continues,
63 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A8 (April 2, 2001).
67 See id.
61 See id.
69 See id.
70 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA 's
Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 103, 126 (2001).
"' PROCTOR, supra note 10, at 153.7 2 CROSS, supra note 33, at 14 (quoting Control of Carcinogens in the Environment, Hearing
Before the Subcornn. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (statement of Dr. Bernard Weinstein).
73 Bruce Ames, leader in cancer research and author of several works, is often referred to as
the twenty-third most often cited scientist in the English speaking world. PROCTOR, supra
note 10, at 11.
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carcinogens pose no cancer risk because up to a certain point the body has an
ability to detoxify foreign substances.74 These scientists argue that high dose
animal studies overstate the cancer risk to humans.75 Yet John Bailar, IMI,
former editor of the Journal of the National Cancer Institute conducted a
study of more than a thousand separate bioassays to show that high dose
studies underestimate risks almost as much as they overestimate risks.76
Furthermore, David Hoel" discovered through one of the largest United
States rodent carcinogen testing programs that there was no correlation
between toxicity and tumor formation.7 The study showed that a carcinogen
need not reach toxic or near toxic levels in order to cause cancer.79 Modem
science has progressed from being able to detect pesticides at a level of parts
per million in the early 1960s to parts per billion in the 1990s. Yet, despite
an increase in detection capabilities we are still not able to objectively
determine the threshold level below which exposure to a pesticide will not
cause cancer.8 0 Without an understanding of what constitutes a safe threshold
level, knowing how much pesticides are consumed is irrelevant. The only
way to have certainty in the safety of food is to have an absolute ban on those
few chemicals we know have long lasting negative affects.
The current scientific consensus seems to be that an imbalanced diet
is a greater cause of cancer than pesticides and food additives.8' Congress, by
enacting the FQPA, empowered the EPA to consider the effects of pesticide
restrictions on the prices of fruits and vegetables. Because of Congressional
action and scientific consensus, the focus has shifted from preventing
71 See id.
71 See id. at 166.
76 See id. at 170. Proctor writes,
Bailar suggested several reasons why this might be true. High-dose
exposures may kill or sterilize cells, diminishing the opportunity for a
carcinogenic response. High-dose exposures may also work as cancer
suppressants, as implied by the fact that certain chemotherapies cause
cancer at the same time that they obstruct it (8 % of patients successfully
treated with dihydroxybusulfan for ovarian cancer, for example, develop
leukemia with a few years).
Id.
7David G. Hoel was a researcher for the National Toxicology Program and co-author of The
Impact of Toxicity on Carcinogenicity Studies: Implications for Risk Assessment,
Carcinogenesis (1988). PROCTOR, supra note 10, at 170 & n.69.
78 See id.
79 See id.
8 See CRoss, supra note 33, at 14.
8' See LICHTER& ROTHMAN, supra note 40, at 62-64.
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exposure to pesticides to ensuring a balanced diet. Studies by Bruce Ames
and other prominent scientists suggest that environmental regulation of
carcinogenic pesticides "can actually harm health by increasing the price of
fruits and vegetables. ' 2 These scientists fail to consider, however, the power
of market forces. It is possible that if pesticide manufacturers were forced to
sell safer non-carcinogenic pesticides, they would have to lower the prices
of those pesticides to stay competitive instead of passing the price on to the
consumer. This policy would also make American farm products competitive
with their foreign competitors by applying the same safety standards to
foreign importers as are applied domestically. A recent study commented on
by Philip Landrigan a shows that despite Congress' efforts the rate of cancer
in children continues to rise. 84 Lowering regulatory standards in order to
manage import prices is a misguided and dangerous method for protecting
the public health.
3. The United States Should Prohibit the Export of Banned Pesticides
Pesticide poisoning occurs in several ways; the toxic chemical may
be ingested, inhaled or absorbed through the skin.85 Some pesticides are
necessary to prevent insects, nematodes, fungi, weeds and rodents from
destroying the world's food supply. 6 In fact, in certain cases some pesticides
82 PROCTOR, supra note 10, at 144.
83 PBS reported:
Philip Landrigan is chairman of the Department of Community and
Preventative Medicine at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New
York and director of Mount Sinai's Center for Children's Health and the
Environmental. He is a professor of pediatrics and preventative medicine
... and a former senior advisor to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) for Children's Health and the Environment .... From 1988 to
1993, Dr. Landrigan served as chair of the Committee on Pesticides in the
Diets of Infants and Children at the National Academy of Sciences,
National Research Council (NRC).
Public Broadcasting System, Trade Secrets Expert Interviews, at http://www.pbs.org/trade
secrets/program/ interviews.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
84 See Pat Phibbs, Study Says Environmental Factors Stronger Than Heredity as Potential
Cause of Cancer, 31 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1635 (Aug. 4, 2000) (The study shows that "the rate
of contracting non-Hodgkin's lymphoma is increasing... [due] to exposure to pesticides.").
85 See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1026, citing D. BULL, A GROwING: PESTICIDES AND THE
THIRD WORLD POOR 28 (1982).86See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1029.
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have been used to prevent the spread of diseases such as malaria.87 However,
there are several pesticides that the United States government has identified
as containing cancer-causing agents. These carcinogenic pesticides were
banned for use in the United States and should be banned from export to third
world countries. American lives can be exposed to dangerous pesticides in
more ways than just through imported foods. There was one case in which
pesticides which were applied in West Africa were blown back into the
United States by the Atlantic trade winds. 88 The FDA believes that its
resources for import surveillance are not keeping pace with increased entries
and the fiscal reality makes it improbable that regulatory resources will ever
match this increase.89 The only way to ensure that American lives are safe
from exposure to banned pesticides is to prohibit their export.
II. CURRENT UNITED STATES LAWS ON PESTICIDES
A. Application of the FQPA
"Pesticides are substances used to prevent, destroy, repel or mitigate
any pest ranging from insects, animals and weeds to microorganisms such as
fungi, molds, bacteria and viruses."9 The Federal Insecticide Fungicide,
Rodenticide Act9' ("FIFRA") empowers the EPA to register pesticides and
set tolerance levels.92 "A 'tolerance' is the level of a specific pesticide
allowed on a specific agricultural commodity." '93 The FDA and United States
Department of Agriculture ("USDA") enforce these tolerance levels by
inspecting foods being imported.94 The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act95 ("FFDCA") prohibits the sale of "adulterated" food.96 The FFDCA
s See id. (DDT has been one of these pesticides).
8 See id.
89See Linda R. Horton, Food From Developing Countries: Steps to Improve Compliance,
53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 139, 145 (1998) citing FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., REPORT OF THE FDA
TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION 5, 5 (1992).
90 EPA official website, at http://www.epa.gov/ebtpages/pesticides.html.
9' Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
92 See Vogt, supra note 16, at 6.
93 Edward McDonald, Jr., Note, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: By Removing
Chemical Irritantsfrom ourEnvironment Will It Generate Trade Irritants to Replace Them?,
25 WM. & MARY ENVTL L. & POL'Y REv. 749, 751 (2001).
94 See Vogt, supra note 15, at 6.
95 See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-97 (2000).
96 See Robert M. Millimet, The Impact of the Uruguay Round and the New Agreement on
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defines an adulterated food as one that "bears or contains any poisonous or
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health."9' 7 The EPA
conducts studies to determine the levels at which each pesticide presented for
registration may be safely used.98A pesticide can receive a registration if it
presents "no unreasonable effects to man or the environment, taking into
account the economic, social and environmental costs and benefits of the use
of any pesticide." The Delaney Clause legally defined any cancer-causing
agent as presenting an unreasonable risk."° Therefore, pesticides such as
DDT, dieldrin and chlordane were banned from use in the United States.
If DDT, dieldrin, and chlordane were evaluated on today's standard
there would be no certainty that these dangerous pesticides would have been
banned. Under today's standards advocates for the use of banned pesticides
such as DDT may argue that the pesticides can be valuable tools in
preventing the spread of vector-borne diseases. This argument should fail
because the use of DDT in India shows that these carcinogens are not
affective tools for disease prevention. In India the initial use of DDT reduced
the spread of malaria from 7.5 million cases to 50,000; however the insects
developed a resistance to DDT and the number of cases increased back to 6.5
million.' In that instance DDT failed to stop the spread of malaria, it
increased the resistance of the pests, and it increased the cancer risk to the
entire population. Unfortunately, today's standard makes the disease
prevention argument a viable reason for allowing the use of other
carcinogenic pesticides.Thus, the negligible risk standard may result in
exposing the American public to lethal pesticides due to poor policy
decisions as well as errors in scientific analysis.
The negligible risk standard is supposed to be more effective than the
Delaney Clause because it provides special protection for infants and
children and it requires the assessment of cumulative risks. "In establishing
tolerances, EPA must assess risks to infants and children on the basis of
'available information' concerning (1) consumption patterns among infants
and children, (2) special susceptibility of infants and children and (3)
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: An Analysis of the U.S. Ban on DDT, 5 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 443,472 (1995) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 33 l(a)).
17 Horton, supra note 89, at 142 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1)).
See Vogt, supra note 16, at 6.
Id. at 6.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
101 See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 75.
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cumulative effects of exposures to infants and children."'' 2 The EPA is
required to assess the cumulative risk of exposure to multiple pesticides
which have similar modes of toxicity.'l 3 Currently the EPA plans to evaluate
three classes of pesticides-organophosphates, carbamates, and
chloracetanilide herbicides."° There is no doubt that a cumulative risk
assessment would be a valuable tool in identifying the true carcinogenic
character of pesticides.The problem with setting policy based on the
cumulative risk assessment method is that it is a new and undeveloped
system, which can lead to decisions being based on guesses instead of
empirical analyses.0 5 Unfortunately, the assessment is based on the scarce
scientific evidence that exists today. In 1998 Fenner Crisp, special assistant
to the EPA assistant administrator, said, "the EPA has had 'little experience'
with evaluating classes of similar pesticides."" 6 Congress, recognizing that
the information is not perfect, requires the EPA to apply a 'tenfold margin of
safety' to take into account "potential pre- and post-natal toxicity."' ' 7 While
this precaution may seem reasonable it still may fail to capture the true error.
B. Tolerances Under the FQPA
A banned pesticide may not be sold or distributed within the United
States. "However, as long as the pesticide's tolerances remain in effect, foods
containing residues of the pesticides may be sold in the United States."'
0 8
Federal law does not require that the tolerances of banned pesticides be
canceled. " Since the enactment of the child protection standard in 1996 the
EPA has struggled with limited resources and very little congressional
guidance on some critical issues. "0 This means that Congress has allowed the
EPA to spend the last five years importing known carcinogens without
knowing the levels at which they can be imported safely. The EPA
102 See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2000).
o3 See21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(D)(v) (2000) ("[T]he administrator shall consider... available
information concerning the cumulative effects of such residues and other substances that
have a common mechanism of toxicity.").
"o See Cumulative Exposure, Risk Estimates May Include Residues of Banned Chemicals,
21 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1558 (Mar. 6, 1998).
1o5 See id.
106 Id.
17 McGarity, supra note 70, at 118.
loB GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 12.
1o6 See id.
"1o See McGarity, supra note 70, at 134.
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recognizes that the tolerances for pesticides that have been banned should be
revoked."' The EPA's 1982 policy states, "[w]hen a pesticide's registration
for a food or feed use is canceled because of a concern about the safety of the
pesticide, the associated tolerance . . . is no longer justified and logically
should be revoked."' " The EPA went on to state, "the [FDA and USDA] are
concerned that having formal tolerances remaining in effect for canceled
pesticides may serve to condone use of these pesticides in this country and/or
in or on commodities imported from foreign countries.. '".3 The 1996
amendment of the FFDCA established that the tolerances of banned
pesticides must be revoked within 180 days of the suspension of the pesticide
registration. 4
Banning a pesticide for use in the United States, however, does not
necessarily mean that the tolerance will be revoked. The FFDCA allows the
EPA to maintain tolerances for certain banned pesticides which the
administrator determines are unavoidable. "5 The FDA, EPA and USDA have
created action levels that function as tolerances for certain pesticides such as
DDT, chlordane, and dieldrin.1 6 These pesticides are Persistent Organic
Pollutants ("POP"s) because they do not break down readily in the
environment. "7 The EPA allows certain levels of these pesticides to exist in
foods on the grounds that exposure is unavoidable as a result of the
widespread use during the 1950s and 1960s." 8 However, the continual
production and exportation of banned pesticides perpetuates the cycle of
pollution and prevents the environment from ever becoming cleansed of the
illegal pesticides. The FDA, EPA and USDA are tasked with setting action
levels that are low enough to make the health risks negligible." 9 However,
in 1994 a study by the EPA on the residues of DDT, chlordane, and dieldrin
in fish reported that the action levels were still too high to protect the health
of consumers who eat fish.120
"' GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 12.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(1)(2) (2000).
,' See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(1)(4) (2000).
116 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 12.
117 See id.
118 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 12-13.
19 See id.
120 See id.
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C. United States Regulation of Pesticide Exports
The only major efforts by the United States to regulate the export of
pesticides have been to require informed consent from the country to which
the pesticide is being exported. In January 1981, President Carter responded
to the concern over the hazards raised by exporting pesticides by enacting
Executive Order Number 12,264, which established a United States
Hazardous Substances Export Policy.' 2' "The order strengthened export
notice requirements already required by statute and established formal export
licensing controls for 'extremely hazardous substances."' ' 122 "However, the
Prior Informed Consent system is flawed. Opponents argue that the process
duplicates information exchange systems already in existence. The system
is also impractical, because it burdens a high speed industry that requires
rapid movement of agricultural products to prevent spoilage, food shortage,
and famine.' 23 Ultimately, the informed consent program is an ineffective
tool for preventing the circle of poison. In 1990 the United States Customs
Service reported that seventy-three percent of the 465,338,865 pounds of
pesticides shipped from the United States contained incomplete and
inaccurate labeling making it impossible to accurately assess the hazard level
of the pesticides. 24 Of the pesticides that were identifiable the Customs
Service records indicate that 52,022,337 pounds were banned, unregistered
or restricted-use pesticides. 25
III. INTERNATIONAL PESTICIDE POLICIES
The international trade of agricultural products is regulated by three
major methods: 1) international quality standards; 2) international trade
agreements; and 3) national regulatory laws.
.21 See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1035, citing Exec. Order No. 12,290, 3 C.F.R. § 127
(1982).
122 Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1035.
123 Reynolds, supra note 4, at 78.
124 See id. at 93.
'2 See id. at 94.
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A. Pesticide Regulation and Codex
International organizations have traditionally focused on regulating
pesticides by creating a better information network. 126 In 1962 the Codex
Alimentarius Commission ("Codex") was created to establish an inter-
national standard for science-based food safety and quality. 127 Codex operates
under the joint umbrella of the Food and Agriculture Organization, a branch
of the United Nations ("UN"), and the World Health Organization. 128 Codex
is recognized as the international authority on food safety and quality. 1
29
Because Codex standards are used by many countries as the basis for their
food regulations, the United States has a vested interest in ensuring that
Codex standards are scientifically and technically sound. '30 The United States
has representatives in two thirds of the Codex Committees and task forces.
Unfortunately, despite the United States' extensive involvement many of the
Codex standards for pesticides, food additives and nutritional labeling are
substantially weaker than United States standards.' 3' When a country ships
adulterated food it violates the Codex Code of Ethics for International Trade
in Food. 32 However, Codex regulation is nonbinding.133 When adulterated
food products are detected the importing country should inform the
authorities in the exporting country. 134 Codex relies on the laws and
governmental agencies within the exporting country to enforce the code of
ethics. 135 Ultimately, this places the safety of American lives in the hands of
foreign governments, many of which do not have the level of sophistication
necessary to enforce their own laws.
126 See Bartlett P. Miller, The Effect of The GA TTand the NAFTA on Pesticide Regulation:
A Hard Look At Harmonization, 6 CoLO. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 201, 209 (1995).
327 See Joseph A. Levitt & Michael Wehr, The Importance ofInternational Activities to the
Work of the Food and Drug Administration 's Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition,
56 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 1, 6 (2001).
28 See Cindy Joffe Hyman, Food For Thought: Defending the Organic Foods Production Act
of 1990 Against Claims of Protectionism, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1719, 1723 (2000).
S29ee Goldman, The Legal Effect of Trade Agreements on Domestic
Health and Environmental Regulation, J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 11, 18-19 (1992). See also
Levitt & Wehr, supra note 122, at 6; Hyman, supra note 123, at 1723 (explaining that Codex
Alimentarius Commission has 165 member countries).
30 See Levitt & Wehr, supra note 127, at 6.
... See Goldman, supra note 129, at 18-19.
332 See Horton, supra note 89, at 149.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 151.
131 See Horton, supra note 89, at 151.
250 [Vol. 27:231
IMPORTING DEATH AS FREE TRADE
As an international regulatory agency Codex sets international
tolerances for carcinogenic pesticides." 6 he FQPA requires that the EPA
consider the Codex standard when setting tolerances.3 7 If the EPA adopts a
standard that is different from the Codex standard the FQPA places an
additional reporting burden on the EPA. 3 1 In such a case, 21 U.S.C. §
346a(b)(4) requires that the EPA issue a public comment explaining why
they are not adopting the international standard. "' Thus the FQPA has the
effect of transforming the non-binding Codex standards into an international
standard to which the EPA is accountable. The added reporting burden acts
as a disincentive for the EPA to diverge from the Codex standard.
B. Pesticide Regulation and GAIT
1. Development of the GATT
Trade agreements play a central role in regulating the use of
pesticides in the international food trade.
The purpose of forming a trade agreement between countries
is to eliminate barriers to free trade that are created by a lack
of uniformity in national policies. In order to facilitate their
ability to compete in global trade, individual nations have
formed regional agreements to remove domestic regulations
that discriminate against trade between countries who are
parties to a particular agreement.
1 40
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), the UN's
"' See Hyman, supra note 128, at 1723 (In 2000 The Codex Alimentarius contained more
than 200 food safety standards, guidelines and codes of practice.).
' See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(4) (2000) (In establishing a tolerance for a pesticide chemical
residue in or on a food, the Administrator shall determine whether a maximum residue level
for the pesticide chemical has been established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.).
"3 See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(4) (2000).
139 See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(4) (2000) (If a Codex maximum residue level has been
established for the pesticide chemical and the Administrator does not propose to adopt the
Codex level, the Administrator shall publish for public comment a notice explaining the
reasons for departing from the Codex level.).
"4 Marc Victor, Precaution or Protectionism? The Precautionary Principle, Genetically
Modified Organisms, and Allowing Unfounded fear to Undermine Free Trade, 14
TRANSNAT'L LAW 295, 298 (2001).
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International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides and
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") are all international
trade agreements that have played a major role in the regulation of pesticides.
"Trade agreements allow restrictions on the importation of goods under
certain circumstances.'' Unfortunately, all of these agreements have fallen
far short of providing the necessary protection to American citizens.
The agreement that formed the [World Trade Organization]
is a truly global trade agreement consisting of 134 member
countries and thirty observers, of which both the EU and the
United States are members. The goal of the [World Trade
Organization] agreement is the same as the goal of regional
trade agreements: the elimination of discriminatory barriers
to trade. 42
The GATT was established in 1947 in response to the World War II
economic summit held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.143 The agreement
is designed to have several rounds in which binding international rules are
adopted in an effort to reduce trade barriers.'" Before the Tokyo Round the
international community did not recognize the relationship between trade and
environmental regulation. 14 The Tokyo Round146 was criticized for lacking
a green component. 147 The environmentalist criticism sparked the focus on
environmental harmonization in the Uruguay Round.
The major provisions of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, 148 which
regulate pesticides, are the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") 149 and the Agreement on
141 Id.
142 id.
'41 See Miller, supra note 126, at 210.
144 See id. at 211.
145 See id.
146 Tokyo Round of GATT, Mar. 29, Oct. 22 & 26, 1979, T.A.I.S. 9975, 18 I.L.M. 553 &
1052 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 26, 1980).
147 See Miller, supra note 126, at 211.
14 1 See Horton, supra note 89, at 152 (1998) (citing Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125).
"4 See Horton, supra note 89, at 152 (citing Agreement on the Application of Sanitary or
Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, pmbl., arts. 2.1, 3.3 in Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1381 [hereinafter SPS Agreement]); see also Miller, supra note 121, at 211.
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Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement"). 50 The SPS Agreement
created exceptions to the GATT rule against trade barriers if the measure is
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.' The SPS
Agreement requires measures to be based on scientific principles. The SPS
Agreement works with the TBT Agreement to prevent violative trade
barriers. 52 The TBT Agreement guides the development, adoption and
application of product standards and procedures applied to determine
whether a certain product meets the international standards. 5 3 Both
agreements recognize the sovereign right of countries to establish their
chosen levels of consumer protection.54 This means that the third world
countries that are using banned pesticides are free to set lower export/import
standards then those of the United States. Therefore, a third world country
knowing that the United States is only able to inspect one percent of
imported food products... may choose to send adulterated foods if the
chances of economic gain are higher than the chances of getting caught. The
success of many of the international regulatory efforts depends on whether
the exporting country has incorruptible officials who rigorously enforce
rational legislation and regulation. 5 ' A country with lower standards than
ours may also utilize the international forum to force the United States to
lower its standards. 1
57
In 1985 the UN Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO") adopted
the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides
("Code of Conduct") which was adopted as part of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT.' The Code of Conduct established standards for the manufacture,
packaging, labeling and disposal of pesticides.'59
"0 See Horton, supra note 89, at 152 (citing Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr.
15, 1994, pmbl., in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1427 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
"'J See Hyman, supra note 128, at 1724.
152 See id.
's See id. at 1724.
15 See Horton, supra note 89, at 152.
' See Stephanie Dreckman, Negotiating Environmental Standardsfor an AgriculturalFree
Trade Agreement Between Chile and the United States, 4 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 227, 233
(1997).
156 See Horton, supra note 89, at 154 & 158.
'"See Miller, supra note 126, at 217.
'
58 See id. at 210.
159 See id.
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A pesticide is placed in the PIC [Prior Informed Consent]
process noted above if the pesticide meets one of three
criteria: (1) the chemical has been banned for health or
environmental reasons in five or more countries; (2) the
chemical has been banned or severely restricted for health or
environmental reasons in a single country after January 1,
1992; or (3) the chemical causes health or environmental
problems under the condition of use in developing
countries."'"
The Code of Conduct is not very effective because it is not binding and it
lacks enforcement provisions.'
The Codex standards provide the internationally accepted maximum
restrictions on import laws.'62 A country may impose stronger safety
restrictions on the importation of foods but the country if challenged must
provide "scientific justification" for the higher standard. "' "This requirement
is intended to prevent agricultural protectionism by a WTO member who
may be seeking to evade its free trade commitments to other member
countries.""' Unfortunately, this places the burden of proof on the importing
country to show that its efforts at protecting the health and safety of its
citizens is legitimate. In order to scientifically justify safety measures in
excess of international standards, the SPS Agreement requires a "risk
assessment" to evaluate the likelihood of adverse biological and economic
consequences.'65 "The risk assessment must be based on an examination and
evaluation of available scientific information."'66 In an era in which hundreds
of new pesticides are developed each year, acquiring comprehensive
scientific data on each new pesticide can be a daunting task. The burden is
further exacerbated by the long latency periods and cumulative effects of
most pesticides.
'6 Reynolds, supra note 5, at 82.
16, See Miller, supra note 126, at 211.
162 See Victor, supra note 140, at 307-308.
163 See id. at 307.
6 See id.
165 See id.
'66 See id.
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2. The GATT and International Harmonization
The United States challenge to the European Union's ("EU") ban on
the use of hormones in beef is an example of how an international treaty can
be used to defeat national efforts to protect its citizens. In 1980, the illegal
use of hormones in veal production caused hormonal irregularities in some
European children.6 7 Consumer concern over the use of hormones motivated
the EU to ban the importation of food products with genetically engineered
hormone stimulants. 6 ' The enforcement of the directive resulted in a ban on
most of the United States beef products. 69 The WTO commissioned several
studies that found that the use of hormones produced little health risk.170 The
EU tried to argue that the ban was justified because it removed all the
possibility of risk.' 7' The Appellate body of the WTO held that the EU could
not ban the use of the hormones on a "zero risk" policy- The EU also tried
to invoke Article 5.7, which is a precautionary clause that allows provisional
application of a safety measure "in cases where relevant scientific evidence
is insufficient."' The appellate body held that a precautionary measure
could not be implemented without sufficient scientific evidence to support
its necessity. 74 This decision had the effect of preventing a national
government from responding to public concern and increasing safety
measures without first having extensive scientific data to justify the
precaution. While the United States' efforts to remove the ban may have
been a huge success for the United States beef export industry, commentators
have noted that the rejection of the "precautionary principle" may backfire
on the United States environmental efforts in the future.1
75
The inability to restrict pesticides that have not been extensively
tested places the American public in the position of being a victim of the
same risks that existed in the 1940s when DDT was first introduced. DDT
was first introduced in 1939 against the Colorado potato beetle which was
167 See Victor, supra note 140, at 309.
161 See id. at 310.
169 See Victoria Zerjav, United States/European Union Trade Relations: The Need For A
Solution To The Bovine Trade Dispute, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 645, 650 (2000).
17' See Victor, supra note 140, at 311.
171 See id.
172 See id.
' Id. at 314.
174 See id. at 307.
17 See Victor, supra note 140, at 314 n.157 (citing Steve Charnovitz, Environment and
Health Under WTO Dispute Settlement, 32 INT'LLAW 901, 913 n.89 (1998)).
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plaguing Europe. 176 The first American tests were not conducted until 1942,
but the product scored so impressively in the initial tests that it went into
mass use immediately. 177 Like DDT unregistered pesticides being used in
foreign countries have the potential of gaining popularity and mass use
before adequate studies have been conducted to assess its true danger. When
DDT was introduced scientists were sensitive to the dangers of DDT to
human health but a lack of regulatory and legal power prevented any action
from being taken until the casualty rate rose so high that Congress could no
longer ignore its fatal effects.'78 One historian noted that in the 1940s "the
failure to escape a DDT residue hazard was due less to ignorance that
residues might be dangerous... than to the lack of legal power to prohibit
the sale and use of DDT until its safety could be determined.' ', 79 Likewise,
under the GATT, the FDA may have some evidence that an unregistered
pesticide might be dangerous but the lack of scientific data and treaty
restrictions may prevent the United States from enacting the precautions to
prevent American exposure to the risk.
The United States government has reassured the public that the
United States will not compromise the health and safety of its citizens for
international harmony. '80 However, this policy has proven false on more than
one occasion. In 1990, when EPA inspectors detected the fungicide
procymidone in some French and Italian wines imported from the European
Community,'81 the EPA issued temporary tolerance levels for the fungicide
in order to avoid GATT dispute procedures. 8 The GATT does not have the
authority to overturn United States federal law;' 83 however, the political
pressure created by the threat of a dispute resolution and possible inter-
national sanctions can influence legislatures to compromise national safety
for international harmonization. Just as the United States has used the GATT
dispute resolution process to force other countries to lower their standards the
United States can also be forced to lower its standards. For example, the
United States challenged the United Kingdom on its health-based ban on the
76ee WHORTON, supra note 9, at 248.
177 See id. at 248.
171 See id. at 251.
'79 WHORTON, supra note 9, at 251.
180 See Kurt Hofgard, Is This Land Really Our Land?: Impacts ofFree Trade Agreements on
U.S. Environmental Protection, 23 ENVTL. L. 635, 662 (1993).
181 See Miller, supra note 126, at 213.
182 See id.
183 See Millimnet, supra note 96, at 486.
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sale of moist snuff using the dispute resolution provisions of GATT.' The
United States tobacco industry successfully overturned the ban through an
action in the British courts. 8 5 However, it was the threat of international
action that prevented the British government from reinstating the ban on
proper procedural grounds."s6 Anytime the United States is able to force an
international power such as the United Kingdom to lower its standards there
is no reason why we should not believe that we too may become victims of
international pressure.
C. Pesticide Regulation and NAFTA
Neither the GATT nor the NAFTA and its side agreements have been
sufficient tools for establishing any reliability in the safety of internationally
traded foods. "87 NAFTA and its side agreements were established in 1993
between Mexico, Canada and the United States. "88 The agreements are best
analyzed as part of the North American Regime. The regime is comprised of
NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC")
and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
("NAAEC"). 8 9 Originally President Bush only wanted NAFTA as a method
of combating the trade blocs that were forming in Europe and Asia. l
Outcry from a coalition of labor, environmental, agricultural, and human
rights groups postponed the signing of the agreement until President Clinton
entered into office.' 9 ' President Clinton championed the cause of the
environmentalists and labor unions and was able to negotiate the NAALC
and NAAEC.' 92 NAFTA, through the NAAEC, recognizes that it is
inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or
environmental measures. 93 The NAAEC addresses many of the environmen-
384 See Goldman, supra note 129, at 15-16.
385 See id.
186 See id.
87 See Horton, supra note 89, at 152 (citing North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7,
1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) & 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993)).
"
8
" See Paul Stanton Kibel, The Paper Tiger Awakens: North American Environmental Law
After the Cozumel Reef Case, 39 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 395, 407 (2001).
189 See id.
'90 See id. at 405.
191 See id. at 407; Carrie Dolrnat-Connell, After NAFTA: Can a New International
Convention on Toxic Trade Be Far Behind, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 443, 465- 67 (1994).
92 See Kibel, supra note 188, at 407.
193 See id. at 412.
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talists' fears of harmonizing downward by allowing each country to create
it's own environmental standards while requiring strict enforcement of those
standards. 94 The NAAEC has a substantial amount of enforcement authority.
The agreement allows actions to be brought by citizens against any of the
three governments, and it allows actions by the governments in the agree-
ment against each other.' Since March of 2000, fifteen claims have been
adjudicated before the secretariat of NAFTA. 96 None of the claims have
involved pesticides. 97 The major difference between the North American
Regime and other international treaties is that the regime encourages
countries to consider prohibiting the export of banned pesticides.'98 One
commentator stated with excitement:
Most significantly, the United States has for the first time
agreed to consider a total prohibition on the export of banned
pesticides. Even though the phrase 'considering' allows the
U.S. government significant interpretational leeway, it
nevertheless represents a major shift in U.S. policy toward
this issue. 99
If the United States were to prohibit the export of banned pesticides
it would have a major economic affect on the pesticide industry. "In 1990
approximately twenty-five percent of the pesticides exported from the United
States were banned, severely restricted, or unregistered."' 0'° However, such
a prohibition may provide the necessary push to drive developing countries
toward utilizing safer pesticides and better technology.
In May 2001, the UN took a major step toward effecting an
international ban on many of the same pesticides that are banned in the
United States. The Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
194 See Dolmat-Connell, supra note 191, at 467- 68.
1 See Kibel, supra note 188, at 414.
'9 See id. at 417.
19' See generally, id. at 417, 418-47 (citing Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters:
Registry and Public Files of Submissions, at http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_
registry/index.cfin? varlan=english.)
,9S ee Dolmat-Connell, supra note 188, at 467- 68.
199 Dolmat-Connell, supra note 188, at 468-69.
'00 Hofgard, supra note 180, at 661.
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Stockholm Convention on POPs identified twelve POPs20' that should be
banned.2"2 The Act calls on each participating country to prohibit the
production and use of the twelve POPs. 23 However, the UN identified
several exceptions under which the POPs may be used. The Act fails to
protect the world's food supply because it allows the continued use of aldrin
and dieldrin as insecticides. 2 4 Furthermore, the Act does not apply to
pesticide residues.20 5 Each country is allowed to apply to the executive
director of the United Nations Environment Program who is the acting
secretariat of the Act2 6 for an exemption for certain uses. 207 The agreement
is binding but the impact of the agreement on United States law and policy
remains to be seen. As of this note Congress has not created any legislation
limiting the export of banned pesticides beyond the Federal Informed
Consent requirements.20 8
IV. DOMESTIC ACTIONS
A. Current Action by the United States
The FDA acknowledged that the growth in the volume and variety of
imported foods has significantly reduced the effectiveness of the traditional
monitoring and border inspection methods of preventing the importation of
adulterated foods." Therefore, the FDA has embarked on a variety of
international activities aimed at addressing various issues in third world
countries from whom we import food.2 0 The FDA's Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition has created an action agenda for 2000-2002, which is
201 See Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants, 22-23 May, 2001, n. 1 (listing aldrin, chlordane, dieldrin,
DDT, endrin, heptachlor, hexachlorbenzene, mirex, toxaphene, PCBs, dioxins, and furans).
202 See Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants, 22-23 May, 2001, art. 3, at http://unep/pops/conf/2.gov.
203 See id. art. 3(l)(a).
2
c
4 See id. app. A.
205 See id. app. A n. i.
20 6 See id. art. 20(3).
2'0 See id. art. 8(1).
2o" See generally 21 U.S.C. § 346a (2000). See 7 U.S.C. § 136o(a) (2000) "Notwithstanding
any provision of this subchapter, no pesticide or device or active ingredient used in
producing a pesticide intended solely for export to any foreign country shall be deemed in
violation of this subchapter .... "
,o9 See Levitt & Wehr, supra note 129, at 1.
210 See Horton, supra note 89, at 145.
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focused on: "1) Regulatory activities; 2) International harmonization; 3)
Development, maintenance, and dissemination ofCFSAN's [Center for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition] science base; 4) Equivalence evaluations, food
safety needs assessment, and food safety technical cooperation and
assistance; and 5) International trade agreements and other trade related
activities., 21' The FDA's efforts at increasing the regulation of imported
foods is limited to the six point program articulated in response to the July
3, 1999 presidential memorandum dealing with unsafe imported foods.212
The program focuses on identifying problem importers, prohibiting the re-
importation of previously rejected foods, setting standards for private
laboratory collection, increasing the analysis of imported foods and imposing
fines for violations.1
B. Suggested Action
There have been several attempts to enact legislation that would
restrict the export of hazardous pesticides from the United States. For
example,in 1980 Representative Michael Barnes, a democrat from Maryland,
proposed a bill that would have prohibited the export of all hazardous
products without a government license.2t4 However, the bill was defeated
twice in committee. 5 In 1990, "Circle of Poison" legislation, which would
have banned the exportation of certain illegal pesticides, including chlordane
and heptachlor passed both the House and Senate.1 6 Unfortunately, it was
killed in the eleventh hour by the Bush administration on behalf of the
chemical manufacturers. 27 Then, in 1994, President Clinton was
unsuccessful in passing a similar bill.2 18
The EPA has the power to revoke both tolerances and action levels for
banned pesticides. 9 Unfortunately, it has been taking on average over 6
years per use to revoke a tolerance level.220 The long delay is the result of the
21 Levitt & Wehr, supra note 129, at 2-3.
"22 See id. at 6.
213 See id.
214 See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 1036, citing H.R. 6587, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
213 See id. at 1036.
226 See Laurel Druley, Still Dumping After All These Years, MOTHER JONES, at
http://www.motherjones.com/newswire/ velsicol.html (last visited Nov. 11, 1997).
217 See id.
21B See id.
229 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 12.
220 See id.
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following reasons: one, the EPA gives a time allowance for food producers
to exhaust their remaining stocks of the pesticide and for contaminated
products to move through the market; two, revocation has not been a top
priority; and three, there are no guidelines for linking revocation to
cancellation. 2'
The regulatory constraints and fiscal realities of the import process
make it unlikely that the FDA will ever be able to eliminate the importation
of contaminated foods through a regulatory scheme. Therefore, the FDA has
looked to other options for controlling the use of pesticides on imported
foods. The FDA is moving toward a strategy of helping the originating
countries improve their information and production techniques.2 Some
commentators support holding exporting countries responsible for the safety
of their products and reducing import controls. 23 They argue that border
checks are more expensive for the importing United States than the
originating country and the quality of perishable products are diminished by
being held in storage while inspections are conducted. 24 However such an
approach would not be reliable while the producing countries continue to rely
on banned pesticides for pest and insect control. The regulatory burden of
monitoring banned pesticides could be completely eliminated with a
prohibition on exporting banned pesticides.
V. CONCLUSION
The repeal of the Delaney Clause is a move from a precautionary zero
tolerance system to a more risky "science based" system. The new statute
allows the EPA to base its decision on the then current scientific knowledge.
The problem with using a scientific standard is that scientific evidence can
be flawed. A mistake in determining the level of risk presented by a pesticide
can cost lives. One of the major reasons why cancer research is so
inconclusive is the long latency periods.225 This means that a mistake today
may not be detected until years later at which point the exposure levels could
be enormous. The Delaney Clause was developed when the effects of DDT
were very salient and the focus was on protecting human safety first.
221 See id. at 5.
222 See Horton, supra note 89, at 146.
221 See id. at 148.
224 See id.
225 See CROSS, supra note 33, at 13.
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The EPA has stated on several occasions that a regulatory scheme,
which is grounded in border inspections, is an inadequate method for
maintaining food safety. A self-regulatory scheme will remove some of the
burden from the EPA but it will not be effective for preserving food safety.
This holds especially true if the main pesticides used in growing the foods is
the same pesticide we are trying to avoid when importing the food.
The shift in pesticide regulatory policy is more a reflection of politics
than science. If it were based on science then it seems logical that the EPA
would have been required to remove all tolerances for pesticides that are
banned until they were able to obtain the necessary scientific evidence to
support subjecting the American public to the risk.
International treaties can play a major role in moving the United
States toward prohibiting the export of banned pesticides. The UN treaty on
POPs has brought us one step closer to affecting a global prohibition on the
trade in banned pesticides. It has effectively shifted the burden to the country
importing the pesticide to justify the use of the banned pesticide. This shift
in the way the international market views pesticides may signify that the
international community is unwilling to accept the high risks associated with
using banned pesticides. However, it is quite clear that neither the NAFTA,
the GATT, nor the UN have the power to drive such an initiative.
The United States has the opportunity to lead the way in creating a
safer food quality standard in the international market and it must step up to
the challenge. The fact that we are one of the largest exporters of the banned
pesticides and we are a world leader in both technology and science would
allow us to take the lead in setting a standard that the world would willingly
follow. By prohibiting the export of banned pesticides the United States
would also significantly reduce the amount of lethal pesticides used by third
world countries and it would force them to seek out better technologies. The
long-term effects of eliminating the use of POP's throughout the world
would far outweigh any short-term loss that may be experienced by the
pesticide manufacturing industry. There is the possibility, however, that a
prohibition will have negligible negative affect. The pesticide manufacturers,
if forced to, may simply shift their focus to the many other pesticides, which
are not banned and are safer.
Congress, by enacting the FQPA, has empowered the EPA to set
standards that balance the value of having a variety of foods reaching the
American market versus the health risks of ingesting dangerous pesticides.
Unfortunately this sort of calculus fails to consider all of the relevant factors.
Congress and the EPA should also consider the cost of the American lives
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lost from cancer and pesticide poisonings and the benefit of prohibiting the
export of banned pesticides.
